The four inputs
- In KEV. Every entry on this site is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, so this is always yes.
- Publicly exposed. About your asset, not the flaw: can unauthenticated or untrusted parties reach it over a public network such as the internet? You set it per asset. Behind an allow list or a VPN counts as not exposed; "Not known" counts as exposed.
- Automatable. Can an attacker reliably automate every step up to exploitation? CISA publishes its answer for each CVE.
- Total or partial control. Does exploitation give full control of the software, or limited control or information? CISA publishes this too.
Where CISA has not yet published automatable or control for an entry, the stricter value is used and the row says so.
The five timelines
BOD 26-04's table, as CISA publishes it. Entries in the catalog never get more than 14 days; the last two timelines apply to flaws outside it.
Deadlines on this site
- Days are calendar days, counted from the day CISA added the entry to the catalog. A deadline is past due from the day after it.
- CISA's catalog carries its own due date and forensic-triage flag for every entry added since the directive, and says each asset's exposure is yours to judge. For a publicly exposed asset this site uses the earlier of that date and the table's; for an asset that is not exposed, the table alone. A row says when the two differ.
- Every tier is worked out again whenever CISA's catalog or its decision points change. The time is at the top of every page, and your own assets' deadlines follow at once.
- The catalog names products, not versions. A match means an asset may be affected: the advisory says which versions are.
The decision tree
CISA's SSVC decision tree (CISA Coordinator, version 2.0.3): Exploitation, Automatable and Technical Impact, then Mission and Well-Being Impact (Low, Medium or High), which is your own judgement about the organization. Outcomes: Track and Track* (remediate within standard update timelines), Attend (sooner), Act (as soon as possible). This site calls the two models in disagreement when one says faster than the standard cycle (3 or 14 days; Attend or Act) and the other does not; that comparison is this site's own.
What stays with you
- Your organizations, assets, owners, statuses and assessments are kept in your browser. Every visitor gets the same catalog, and the matching happens on your device. Unless you share your list with a team, nothing you enter is sent to this site.
- Clearing the browser's data removes them. The assets page makes a backup file.
Sharing with a team, and email alerts
- A team inventory is the same list kept in step between the browsers that hold its link. Each record is encrypted in the browser (AES-256-GCM) with a key derived from a secret that is only in the link's fragment, the part of an address a browser never sends. This site stores the encrypted records under names it can't read either, and has no way to open them. There are no accounts: whoever has the link can read and change the list.
- Changes meet record by record: the later change wins, and a change beats a removal.
- For email alerts the site needs something it can read, so the browser also sends a product list with counts: for each product your assets run, how many assets and how many of them are publicly exposed. It carries no organization, asset name, owner or version. The addresses that get alerts are kept readable too, and each one has to confirm from a message sent to it.
- An alert is sent when the catalog gains an entry that may affect a product on that list, when the deadline of such an entry gets shorter, and when you add assets that an entry of the last 14 days may affect. It gives the tier and due date for publicly exposed assets and for the others, and CISA's required action. It names no asset: the work list does.
- Removing a team inventory deletes its records, its product list and its addresses from this site. Each browser keeps its own copy of the list.
Sources
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- CISA: BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk
- CISA: BOD 26-04 implementation guidance (forensic triage)
- CISA Vulnrichment: decision points published in the CVE record
- CISA: Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC)
- CERT/CC: SSVC decision points and decision tables
CISA's catalog and its decision points are published under CC0. The two decision tables are CISA's, as published in the CERT/CC SSVC repository. Using them here implies no endorsement by CISA or DHS.